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12 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Wilson

THROUGH : Dr. Clarke

SUBJECT : Intelligence Requirements

1. The purpose of this memo is to give you some considerations and possible talking points on the broad subject of "requirements" which may be useful in your 19 September meeting with the USIB Committee chairmen.

2. In my view, the problem of overall intelligence requirements has never been effectively addressed or structured as a system to which the necessary actions controlling the totality of intelligence endeavor can be related. As we now move into a period of severely constrained dollar and manpower resources for intelligence, the need for strict discipline in the requirements process becomes essential. No longer can the intelligence community do everything for everybody who has a demand or desire for responsive intelligence support.

3. The USIB, as a corporate intelligence community body, is responsible, under NSCID No. 1, for identifying and assigning priorities to all intelligence requirements. While this can be viewed as a national requirements responsibility, there is a multitude of departmental and "tactical" requirements which compete to a very large extent for responsiveness by the same intelligence resources which are tasked with national requirements. We cannot afford the luxury of dedicated resources for all different levels of requirements. Alternatively, the majority of intelligence resources are capable of responding to various levels or sources of requirements. The National/Tactical Interface Study is an effort specifically directed to this end.

4. As General Graham observed, "we are still making resource decisions without an audit trail back to the fundamental requirements

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to be served." This observation applies equally in the national, departmental and "tactical" arenas. And the constrained resources simply will not stretch to cover effectively all these requirements. It appears, therefore, that USIB must take a more active role in identifying, stating and prioritizing all intelligence requirements. As a further step, USIB should then determine the essentiality of action against these requirements by the various resources and collection disciplines available.

5. The current USIB committee structure is reasonably well geared to accomplish this latter task, but has no identifiable arrangement for dealing with the overall requirements problem. Thus, the major collection committees -- SIGINT, HUMINT, and PHOTINT (COMIREX) -- struggle continually to apply the full range of resources and activities with which they are concerned. This is a relatively simple task in the photo area (maintenance of target lists against which photosensors can operate), somewhat more complicated in the HUMINT area, and extremely complex in the SIGINT area where the widest range of requirements are tasked on highly technical systems operating in a technically sophisticated and secure environment.

6. Most, if not all, requirements are stated initially without regard for satisfaction capability, feasibility, complexity or cost. There is little or no effective mechanism for priority ordering all requirements or even those tasked within one collection discipline. There is no formal mechanism for determining which collection discipline can operate most effectively against a given requirement or where there may be trade offs among the different discipline capabilities. Director, NSA, has made the point, for example, that reductions in SIGINT resources have now reached a point where there must be a determination of the essentiality of the SIGINT source against a given requirement, rather than simply recognizing the existence of a SIGINT capability to respond as the basis for tasking.

7. In summary, the elements of the requirements problem confronting USIB include:

- No focal point in our community structure to "staff" requirements for the USIB.

- No effective prioritizing of all requirements regardless of source or application.

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-- No overall requirement evaluation or validation system which would enable us to reject less important or less meaningful requirements.

-- No procedure whereby the essentiality of one "INT" source or another can be clearly associated with a given requirement.

-- There is a "process" for requirements generation and application, but it is not designed as a total system.

8. Several remedies to these problems have evolved from recent rather superficial considerations:

-- Establish a new USIB committee on requirements.

-- Create an ad hoc committee made up of the Chairman of the SIGINT, HUMINT, and COMIREX Committees, possibly under the chairmanship of the D/DCI/NIO.


-- Constitute the NIOs as a requirements committee.

-- Constitute all collection and substantive USIB committee chairmen as a larger ad hoc committee on requirements.

9. None of these propositions has been studied in detail, nor in fact has the overall requirements problem been addressed. There is a compelling need to do so. The IC Staff, with cooperation of certain USIB committee chairmen and perhaps D/DCI/NIO, should take the lead in this effort.

10. Appended hereto are some of the papers which have been developed during recent months as various IC Staff officers considered and commented on the requirements problem.

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Attachments: (4)

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Subject: Intelligence Requirements

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DCI/IC 74-084
3 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Clarke

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Dr. Chalmers
Dr. Lapham

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED]

Piece on Requirements ("The Intelligence Requirements Process" previously distributed)

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1. I intend to work [REDACTED] paper up into a paper to be coordinated with key USIB agencies. [REDACTED] is getting at a fundamental question that has to be answered in order for USIB and for us to do the intelligence job correctly. We are still making resource decisions without an audit trail back to the fundamental requirements to be served. The KIQ/KEP process is going to help, but as of now it is primarily useful in pointing up the lack of a proper requirements system in the total intelligence process. Even with the KIQ/KEP process operating on a steady basis, we still have USIB failing to address its responsibilities effectively in the requirements area.

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2. I have some problems with [REDACTED] approach to the ordering of requirements. To me, a first-order requirement is one that states a fundamental need for intelligence as seen by the user. DCID 1/2 and JSOP Annex A don't quite meet this criterion. They are more on the order of broad guidance and prioritization of effort. The KIQs as presently constituted don't quite fit the criterion either. Some do; some don't. Examples of first-order requirements would be:

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- Monitor Soviet adherence to SALT agreements.
- Monitor the development of Chinese advance weapons programs.
- Keep Soviet SSBNs under surveillance.
- Provide forecasts of worldwide basic food commodity availability, etc.

Perhaps I am speaking here of a better set of the old PNIOs.

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[REDACTED]

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3. As far as the KIQs are concerned, it may be that they should all, in fact, be second-order requirements rather than first, since first-order requirements tend to be so broad that precision in resource expenditure against them is not feasible. Second-order requirements should be a breakdown of first-order requirements into sub-questions that must be answered in order to meet the first-order requirements. In looking over the list of KIQs presently on the books, a number of them fit in this category.

4. The third order of requirements is as [] has stated, those specific elements of information which allow you to answer the second-order questions.

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5. Naturally enough, [] is not delving deep into the parallel problems of requirements levied on human and overt sources. This needs to be fleshed out in the paper. I would appreciate the views of [] and Lew Lapham's people on this matter.

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6. When we float the paper to the Pentagon we need also to address the separation of peacetime and wartime requirements. A good deal of confusion arising across the board (not just with SIGINT) in the requirements business is the admixture of wartime and contingency requirements with the peacetime requirements. Once we have established a requirements hierarchy and system for the peacetime requirements process, we should ask our Pentagon brethren to establish a parallel set for wartime contingencies involving the major commands as required. Such an approach will help [] efforts in the tactical/national intelligence interface game.

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7. I would like to get together on this problem Wednesday afternoon. (It might be useful for the 10:30 meeting on Thursday with the DCI and the NIOs reference the KIQs.)

(Signed)
DANIEL O. GRAHAM, LTG, USA

Daniel O. Graham
Lieutenant General, USA
D/DCI/IC

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